INTRODUCTION
For some thirty years, historians of science and philosophy working on the seventeenth century have endeavored to blur the edges of an opposition that had until then been generally accepted, namely, between the "new philosophy" on [the] one hand and an "old philosophy" on the other. In a nutshell, this generally received opposition was based on the idea that there had been a Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century that consisted not only of the appearance of new sciences or of the discovery of new results in old sciences, but also of a change in the very principles of natural philosophy. From an ontological viewpoint in particular, the "new philosophers" had the right idea of substituting the clear principles of matter and motion for the old obscure entities that were the various occult qualities, substantial forms and virtues of all sorts. And thanks to these new ontological principles, which earned the new philosophers who defended them the title of "mechanical philosophers," it became possible to begin truly to explain natural phenomena and the triumphal road to modern physics was opened.
There were several ways to question the opposition of old and new, as well as the idea that, because of the intrinsic weakness of their principles, ancient philosophers were doomed to disappear when modern philosophers arose. 2 These ways have more or less all been used in 1 Before my arrival in Grenoble, I presented this paper in Paris, Oxford and Aix-en-Provence; I wish to thank the organizers of the corresponding seminars and conferences for giving me the opportunity to make my point more precisely, and the audiences for having obliged me to do so. Unless otherwise indicated, translations are mine.
2 In the words of Brockliss, "Descartes, Gassendi, and the Reception of the Mechanical Philosophy," p. 465: "Twenty years ago, when historians accepted the propaganda of mechanist philosophers, this [the question "why in the course of the half century or so after 1660 some form of the mechanical philosophy replaced scholastic Aristotelianism as the predominant physical philosophy all over western and central Europe"] was an easy question to answer: seventeenth-century Aristotelians were obscurantists, philosophical dinosaurs condemned to extinction in the new world of the Scientific Revolution. Today, … it is a question that seems to become more and more difficult to solve." Brockliss wrote this in 1995. 5 categorization and demarcation between sides, of ordering and partitioning the empire of natural philosophers, was carried out in the seventeenth century. This is precisely what is at stake in this paper.
A DEBATE ON NATURAL PHILOSOPHY Yet, such an enterprise immediately calls for a series of remarks that will help me to focus on a specific debate. To begin with the most obvious point: the result of the demarcation process between the old and the new philosophers differed according to time and place. It is not only that those that are called "new" are by definition always changing; it is also that the very format of the categorization changed. Indeed, until the middle of the seventeenth century, the lists of innovators are very long, and they include the authors who had attempted a reform of Aristotelianism from the end of seventeenth century on, mostly, but not only, in Italy; but after 1660, only a few great names remain, including, at the forefront, Descartes. Let us give a few references to substantiate this assertion.
In an Apologie written in 1625 to defend great men charged with magic, Gabriel Naudé, a physician and the librarian of the Président de Mesmes, mentions a "swarm of Basson, who have no other plan than to elbow aside this philosophy and ruin this great edifice that Aristotle and more than twelve thousand others who have interpreted him worked to build over so many years." In his Advis pour dresser une bibliothèque, written two years later, the swarm has indeed swelled since he adds to the previous novatores "Gilbert, We could think that nothing had changed over the next forty years when we read a letter from Leibniz to his former teacher Thomasius, in which he's already defending a reformist program relying on a reconciliation of the ancients and the moderns. 14 Indeed, 9 Mersenne, Quaestiones in Genesim, resp. Praefatio, n.p., and Paralipolema et observationes, col. 1838.
Nicolas Hill (1570?-1610?) published a Philosophia epicuraea, democritiana, theophrastica. Daniel Garber mentioned this text to me; in his essay in this volume, he calls attention to largely the same lists of novatores, though he makes somewhat different use of them, contrasting the earlier novatores with the later mechanical philosophers.
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Leibniz makes a long list of moderni, whom, he wrote, Thomasius should censure as he censured the now-unknown Michel Baghemihn, a municipal magistrate in Stettin. With all the erudition required when addressing one's former teacher, Leibniz gathers at this point at least three generations of innovators: he begins quite traditionally with the Aristotelian naturalists of sixteenth-century southern Europe (Patrizi, Telesio, Campanella, Bodin, Nizolio, Frascator, Cardano), then he goes on with philosophers of the early seventeenth century to whom we would today attribute different orders of greatness (Galileo, Bacon, Gassendi, Hobbes, Descartes, Basson, Digby, Sennert), and finally he ends up with Protestant partisans of atoms from Thomasius' own generation, whom almost nobody remembers today (Sperling, Derodon, Deusing). 15 And yet I think that Leibniz was here the exception that confirms the rule, the general tendency being at the time to simplify the story and to cut down on the catalogue of innovators.
For example, in the Advertissement of his voluminous Physica, published in 1669-1671, Honoré Fabri criticizes the recentiores who, confounding physics and geometry with forging hypotheses at leisure, are as ridiculous as Democritus, who thought it necessary to tear out his eyes in order to better understand corporeal things. The allusion is crystal clear:
he holds a grudge against Cartesians. 16 It is perhaps Daniel who best expressed the tendency I 15 Johann Sperling (1603-1658), professor of medicine at Wittenberg, was so prolific an author that it is not easy to pin down the book to which Leibniz refers; note however that he published the Antiparasceve. Pro ipsa sit, quàm quid ab iis fictum sit; novum sibi mundum finxerunt, nova, seu potiùs nulla elementa; non coelestes globos, at subtilis materiae turbines, seu vortices; Democritico certè suo haud absimiles, esse voluerunt, qui ut res corporeas, sensibiles, & visibiles meliùs intelligeret, oculos, ut aiunt, eruendos sibi esse putavit" (Fabri, Physica, Auctor lectori, § 3, n.p. Until 1691, the focus of these condemnations, when explicit, is not on the dangers of doubting, as it will be later on, but on the danger that Cartesian physics constitutes for the mysteries of the (Catholic) faith, namely the mystery of Eucharist as officially defined in 1551 by the Council of Trent. Namely, the Cartesian thesis by which the essence of the body is extension and its consequence that the sensible qualities we perceive in bodies, without really belonging to them, result from certain configurations and motions of the extended substance, are judged incompatible with two aspects of the Eucharist. First, according to this mystery, the whole body of Jesus Christ is genuinely, and not symbolically, present in every host; hence, if we admit that the essence of the body is extension and that all extension is local, the body of Jesus Christ has the same local extension as the host. This is however absurd: the extension of the host is too small to contain the body of Jesus Christ; at a given time, there are several hosts in different places of the world, but only one Jesus Christ.
Second, according to the dogma of transubstantiation, the species of wine and bread are real accidents, not false appearances, and they are distinct from the corporeal substance, so that In the following however, I would like to leave aside books (or parts of books) concerned exclusively with the mystery of Eucharist or with the relation of faith and reason, and to focus on the norms to be adopted in natural philosophy. Namely, it is noteworthy that the official censures and condemnations pronounced in the name of theology, as numerous and radical as they were, were not considered to be sufficient. They were assisted by numerous polemical works, the audience of which was not an assembly of narrow-minded regents and boisterous students but, rather, learned companies of courteous honnêtes gens, and the object of which was not (or not only) to reassert the rights of faith, but to defend a certain way of proceeding in physics. In the intellectual context of the time, it is somehow natural that official censorship was not felt to be a sufficient measure to eradicate Cartesianism and that, somewhat belatedly, old philosophers tried to get rid of their image as stubborn pedants, to become more popular among honnêtes gens and to respond to the rise of the new natural philosophy. 33
In the 1660s, an intense Cartesian propaganda emerged, which involved personal Second, as far as the content is concerned, there was a back and forth between natural philosophy and theology. As already noted, the new philosophers ventured to move to the somewhat slippery theological ground when they proposed mechanical explanations of the religion, they sometimes argued that substantial forms lead to licentiousness or paganism. 46 Thus, they responded to the criticism of Rohault, Entretiens sur la philosophie, pp. 106 f.: "[C]ette Doctrine de M. Des Cartes, a esté depuis peu attaquée, par des personnes qui croyent avoir droit, sous pretexte de nouveauté, de s'opposer à tout ce que l'esprit peut découvrir dans les choses Naturelles. Ces personnes ne la combattent point par des raisonnemens philosophiques, et ils s'imaginent qu'il est bien plus aisé de la décrediter en exposant simplement qu'elle est contraire à la Religion" and his following injunction to examine Descartes' doctrine from a purely philosophical point of view. 47 Daniel, Voyage du monde de Descartes, p. 143. Daniel has a deep concern with the characterization of philosophical sects; as we will note infra note 102, he characterizes more specifically the Cartesians by the exclusion of animal souls, and it was indeed a point on which they disagree with their fellows in innovation, the Gassendists. 48 There is no such statement with exceptions that confirm the rule; the most interesting exceptions are Fabri in the camp of old philosophers (on his requalification of substantial forms, see Roux, "La philosophie naturelle d'Honoré Fabri," pp. [87] [88] [89] [90] and Leibniz in the camp of new philosophers.
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But be aware that this ontological question cannot be dissociated from the second one: with respect to which kind of norms were these entities excluded or, on the contrary, defended?
These questions are not totally unprecedented. In a series of seminal papers, Keith
Hutchison systematically confronted the old Scholastics with the new Mechanical Philosophers, arguing that the incentive of their disagreement was not the methodological concern of the latter to avoid the vacuous explanations of the former, but their competing worldviews, in particular with respect to the questions of what should be considered as a cause and what should be considered as a physical entity. 49 I shall not discuss here the details of Hutchison's argument. I do agree with his methodological attempt to render justice to the old philosophers, rather than to put them away on a back shelf. But I do not think that we have to decide whether the bone of contention was whether certain explanations were vacuous or whether they were false: both assertions were at stake. Moreover, as explained, I
think that it might be fruitful to study an actual confrontation, in other words to consider a set of books that explicitly refer and respond to one another. In order to understand this confrontation, I will now review the fairly well-known arguments that were formulated by new philosophers against the ancients and thus make precise what exactly the latter were responding to. Only then will I isolate the generally lesser-known arguments of the ancients.
Finally I will reflect on what we can conclude from this confrontation.
ON THE SIDE OF THE NEW PHILOSOPHERS
According to the longest lists mentioned above, Descartes, Gassendi, Maignan, Cordemoy, pertinent, but rather, to understand the kind of natural philosophy their proponents were opposed to.
It is to be noted that, when they speak of old philosophers, new philosophers use generic designations, as if dealing with a litter of young animals, among which it is neither important to make differences nor to set precedence; a position is neither specified by nor associated with the name of a philosopher, the title of a book or the number of a paragraph, it is presented as a generic position defended in the "ordinary" or "common" philosophy. 51 This type of designation suggests that the new philosophers do not take into account the differences that were significant to the eyes of the old ones, and that in so doing, they may oversimplify some real conceptual problems. Indeed, the new philosophers systematically characterize substantial forms as entities separated from matter, whereas, to the old philosophers, this was only one option among several available. 52 Hence, one sees that it is one thing to establish that, according to the new philosophers, substantial forms were in an illegitimate way credited with a separate existence, and quite another to establish that it was indeed the case that substantial forms had a separate existence. In what follows, it is only the first of these that interests me.
But even if one keeps this clarification in mind, the criticism of the old philosophers often takes a form so grotesque that one gets the feeling of a paradigm shift, as if the new philosophers could not understand the natural philosophy of the ancients anymore, this philosophy being truly incommensurable to theirs in its objectives and in the means it used to achieve them. One can nonetheless identify three factors that enter into this critique, not clearly separated from each other: the entities of the old philosophers are unnecessary, the explanations they offer are trivial or even vacuous, the words they use are unclear or even meaningless. I shall consider these three reasons in turn. the old philosophers to adopt such a way of thinking infused with redundancy, triviality and vacuity. We shall see that the new philosophers also had an answer to this second-order question.
The methodology of ontology: beings should not be multiplied without necessity
The heart of the new philosophers' argument is here that the entities relied on by the old philosophers are superfluous. Once one accepts matter and its modes, figure and motion, substantial forms are no longer necessary to account for natural phenomena. According to the new philosophers, the old philosophers thus made use of superfluous entities, violating the principle of ontological economy by which one must never unnecessarily multiply beings.
Here is a concise formulation of this idea have the capacity to come back to their original state after a deformation). Generality here is bad generality, because one associates with the particular phenomenon in need of an explanation a principle whose only characteristic is that it is the cause of this phenomenon. It is precisely the criticism Arnaud and Nicole address to Aristotle's physics:
[T]he main fault one can find there is not that it is false, but that, on the contrary, it is too true and that is teaches us only things that is it impossible not to know… after learning all these things, it does not seem that one has learned anything new, nor that one is better able to reason as to any of the effects of nature.
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Contrary to how it was in this physics, one must "descend to the particular." Secondly, the new philosophers say that their mechanical explanations are predictive.
To know how the phenomenon is produced is to know which microscopic corpuscular configuration can be its cause, so that he who knows this configuration will be able to predict yet unknown effects. When in this case, Rohault says, one is dealing with experiences that are know whether obscurity and inconceivability are considered as signs of an incorrect ontology or, conversely, assuming the correct ontology is known, they infer that ancient philosophers use obscure terms and have no conceivable idea. 65 In any case, the fact is that the new philosophers constantly refer to simple categorizations of beings: a being is either substance or accident, and then, either spiritual or corporeal. For the sake of brevity I henceforth only focus on the second categorization. The categorization of beings as soul or body is a strict partition: everything belongs either to the category of the soul, or to the category of the body.
The reproach addressed to the old philosophers is thus that they do not respect this partition:
they do not understand that these two categories cover the totality of beings (in other words, they affirm that some beings depend neither on body nor on soul), and they do not realize that this is a strict partition (in other words, they relate certain beings to both body and soul).
The first type of error with respect to the ontological bipartition, asserting the existence of beings that depend neither on the body nor on the soul, is denounced by La Forge, not directly in relation with his ontology, but indeed in relation to his theory of ideas -the presupposition being that something of which we cannot have any idea does not exist:
[U]ndoubtedly terms must seem obscure when no idea corresponds in one's mind to the meaning given to them. Yet we have the idea of only two sorts of beings, generally speaking, namely that which is extended, which we call body, and that which thinks, which we call soul. And starting from when one speaks of other beings, that can be related neither to one nor the other,… such as those beings that one calls substantial forms of bodies, real, impressed, intentional, occult, sympathetic, or specific quality, concoctive, retentive or expulsive faculty etc., it is impossible for any idea to correspond to them in the mind, or that that what one then says have any meaning one can conceive.
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The second type of error with respect to this ontological bipartition is, according to the new philosophers, to assert the existence of entities that are both body and soul, or at least to treat something as if it belongs to one of these categories when in fact it belongs to the other. In the exemplary case of sensible qualities, which soon to be called secondary qualities, the old philosophers are claimed to have the mistaken belief that the feeling that a body causes in us belongs to this body. A passage from Arnauld and Nicole illustrates this idea:
The soul, which saw that it was not by its will that its feelings were excited in it, but that it had feelings only when occasioned by certain bodies, as when it felt heat when approaching fire, was not content to judge that there was something outside itself that was the cause for its having these feelings, about which it would not have been mistaken, but it went beyond this, believing that that which was in these objects was entirely the same as the feelings or ideas that had been occasioned. And from these judgments it formed ideas, by transporting these feelings of heat, color, etc. into the very things that are outside of it. And these are these obscure and confused ideas that we have of sensible qualities, the soul having added its false judgments to what nature let it know.
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Thus, in a recurrent and insistent way the old philosophers project onto bodies sensible qualities that, in fact, exist only in mind.
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In the case of qualities such as gravity, horror vacui, or the capacity of a plant to grow, the criticism is different and, so to speak, reversed. The old philosophers are not accused of projecting onto bodies that which exists only in mind, but of interpreting properties of the body as if they were properties of the mind. Arnauld and Nicole describe this error when they reconstruct the way the old philosophers elaborated their concept of gravity. The starting point consists in two true ideas-there is something that falls, and there is something that is causing this fall. But following a hurried judgment arises a proposition that is not true: the cause of the fall is in the stone. Given the axiom that no body can move by itself, this proposition suggests that the cause of the fall is a being that exists in the stone while being distinct from it. Hence, the stone includes matter, which receives the motion, and a substantial form, which gives the motion and which is the cause of the fall. 69 At this point, however, the old philosophers, assuming they accept the ontological bipartition between body and mind, would think of the substantial form as a mind: if they thought of it as matter, the substantial form would be part of the matter of the stone, therefore one would be right back in the situation one wished to avoid, namely the situation where a body moves by itself.
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Whether they accept this or not, the ancient philosophers are therefore led to think of gravity as a mind acting on the body, and thus once again to commit an error of ontological categorization.
The social twist
The new philosophers also had an answer to the question of what could possibly have made the old philosophers adopt such a system of thought replete with redundancy, triviality and emptiness: they denounce the learned contention of the old philosophers and their relation to the authority of Aristotle. If the old philosophers came to lose the taste for things themselves, to use empty words, to believe that they know something new when they use a new name, or that they had resolved a problem when they had multiplied entities, it is first because they wanted to cover up their ignorance, to appear more knowledgeable than they actually were, and to distance themselves from those they call ignorant or common people. Rohault for instance, criticizes the tendency for them to be accustomed to saying in general that this effect is produced by a quality. For from this custom comes that of giving words as if they were reasons, and the foolish vanity of believing that one knows more than common people, when one knows words the common people don't know… 
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The argumentation of these new philosophers is neither remarkable for its novelty nor its sophistication. On the contrary, one can easily show that regarding the substance of the matter, they merely adopt arguments, ideas or examples that could be found in the older generation, most notably in Gassendi and Descartes and beyond, in some Renaissance discussions. To conceptual sophistication and detailed discussion, they obviously prefer polemics, including swift satire and exaggerated simplification, possibly inspired by their performances in salons, conférences and private academies. Thus we might well wonder about the old philosophers being targeted in this way. In particular, we wonder if not some of them should have been a bit more subtle than Moliere's physicians invoking the "dormative virtue" of opium, if they could hear all of these critics without even trying to answer to them, and if they were all so firmly attached to the Aristotelian camp that they needed to hear yet again what had already been said fifty years earlier.
ON THE SIDE OF THE OLD PHILOSOPHERS
We may be at a loss when asking ourselves who exactly should be included in this group. To include those, who were classified as ancients by the moderns will not do; as already noted, whereas the ancients explicitly name the moderns that they wish to refute, moderns use generic designations when they castigate the "ordinary" or "common" philosophy. In the following, to delineate the hard core of ancients that I shall study, I use two criteria, one that pertains to the format (the typical book I am dealing with is a small format volume written in that Fabri's Physica being too long for the students, it was probably aimed at teachers: among these teachers were obviously the Jesuits here studied. These old philosophers responded blow by blow, and often by turning their arguments back on the new philosophers, so the best way to proceed seems to consider once again the four topics identified previously. As we will show, the old philosophers, full of verve, succeeded in putting in place effective responses to their opponents: but by doing this, they helped to ensure the supremacy of the latter. There is no paradox here: rather, they had recognized the rules proposed by the new philosophers and now played the same game.
The methodology of ontology: the multiplication of corpuscles and the missing metaphysical supplement
The old philosophers give two distinct answers to the accusation that they multiply entities without necessity. First, they denounce the pretensions of the new philosophers, and assert that they are on the same footing as them. The new philosophers claim to have only three principles, matter, figure and motion, and thus to be more economical in beings than the old philosophers. In reality, they proceed exactly as do the old philosophers, because what explains this or that quality is not matter, figure and motion in general, but particular corpuscles with a particular figure and a particular motion. Perhaps old philosophers invented new forms and qualities each time that they had a phenomenon to explain; but, in such circumstances, new philosophers likewise invoke specific figures and specific motions without giving us any reason for this specificity, except their own pleasure. 81 In other words, the ancients accept the principle that one must not multiply beings without necessity, 82 but they assert that modern philosophers perform no better than they do when it comes to the 
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explanation of specific phenomena; they multiply the figures and motions of their corpuscles at will, in just the same way as the old philosophers used to multiply forms and qualities. It is even said that they do worse, insofar as they admit Descartes' thesis that any corpuscle can be changed in any corpuscle: according to Huet, it is impossible in these circumstances to attribute particular effects to particular corpuscles, in the way that particular effects are attributed to particular Aristotelian forms or to particular Epicurean atoms.
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Of course, one might ask just how pertinent these responses are. First, the relation of the notion of form in general to peculiar forms is not the same as the relation of matter to specific corpuscles: in the first case, it is a grammatical relation of subsumption; in the second case, it is a physical relation of specification. Second, the fact that corpuscles change over time does not mean that it is impossible to establish a relation of causality between a kind of corpuscle and some specific effects: the same amount of matter does not have the same effects when organized into different corpuscular configurations. In this paper, however, I do not want to discuss the pertinence of the arguments, but to show that there was an argumentative debate and to reconstruct its lines of force.
The second answer the old philosophers offer is different, but likewise does not contest the principle that beings should not be multiplied without necessity. Namely, this second answer amounts to restricting the application of the traditional catchphrase to ontologically determined domains. The multiplication of forms should not be considered a multiplication of physical beings, simply because forms are not physical beings, but metaphysical principles. With their first answer, the old philosophers claim to be on the same footing as the new philosophers; here, they assert that forms give them an advantage, namely metaphysical supplements that do not serve to explain phenomena in their specificity, but that constitute their metaphysical foundation. This is well expressed by Rochon, who, after having recalled that Aristotelians also used corpuscles in their explanations, describes the opposition of physics and metaphysics as an opposition between the exterior and the interior: You can see, sir, that so far we are equal, and that your philosophy and ours are similar: the difference is that you stop there without going farther, and without even recognizing that there is something else in nature: whereas we believe that we would be stopping at the first surface if we did not seek to penetrate further to discover that beyond all that thus appears outside, there is yet inside something that is the principle of all these dispositions and all these effects, what we call form.
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That equals pulling the rug from under the feet of the new philosophers: if the forms of the ancients are not redundant in the explanation of phenomena, it is not because they are necessary, but simply because their function is not to explain phenomena, but to designate their essence.
The way of physics: one should not indulge in hypotheses, ignore experiments and use empty words
Contrary to what might be expected, against the reproach of not explaining phenomena because they ignore efficient causes, as a rule, the old philosophers do not defend final causes. They rather attack the new philosophers because, devoting all their time to the invention of probable hypotheses regarding corpuscles and motions that could cause this or that phenomenon, they overlook the experiences of both common sense and the new sciences, without providing us with any new knowledge.
New philosophers intended to find explanations that could reduce phenomena to their corpuscular causes, but since these corpuscular causes are not subject to observation, they are hypothetical and probable in a context where science (scientia) was still equated with absolute certainty. Old philosophers insist that corpuscular causes are only probable, just hypotheses, simple fictions. Cartesians to pretend that they could bypass the "only probable" character of their hypotheses. 86 Huet, for example, compares the Cartesian asserting that he can explain the probable origin of the world to a man seated at the gates of Paris who would explain to travelers that they came from one city or the other, simply because it could have been the case that they actually came from one city or the other city.
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It is known that in their teaching the Jesuits at least made way for new observations and experiments that were performed in the first half of the century; 88 in the polemical texts that I am here dealing with, tribute is indeed paid to the experimental philosophy that would have been that of Galileo. 89 The point to understand is that when experience is contrasted with hypothetical reasoning, this concerns both sensory experience and the scientific experiment. Indeed, what is first at stake here is to rehabilitate the sensible qualities and to rely on common sense. Everyone knows that light is spread around the world, a diamond is hard, that snow is white, that fire has heat, and here are the Cartesians telling us "what vulgar philosophy calls sensible qualities, are no accidents of bodies, but are rather modes of our soul, that is to say, real thoughts that we have when encountering objects that present themselves to our." 90 Who then will believe them? As systematically as Rohault stresses for qualities. For him the point is not to assume that one can assimilate the feeling and its physical cause, or jump from the one to the other, but in case of heat, he explains that a series of reasonings makes it possible to attribute some heat to fire:
[T]he Peripatetians do not draw their conclusion that fire is hot from the fact that it produces heat in the hand,… because it is not always necessary that a cause be like its effect. But they conclude that fire must necessarily be hot, because it generally heats all sorts of bodies, however different and opposed they may be, which is very well: because… when an efficient cause produces the same effect in an infinite number of different materials, the production of the effect cannot come from the disposition of the material, since the materials are different and the effect the same.
This is why we are obliged to say then that the cause is like its effect.
91
No ingenuity here, rather the will to reason so as to make a difference, in the sense, between what belongs properly to the body, which seems to be the origin of a particular feeling and what belongs either to the person, who actually has this experience, or to other bodies.
Although this is not the place to go into detail, one can note that the purpose of Fabri's Physica was to establish a physics more geometrico, taking basic qualities (dry and wet, tense and compressed, heavy and light) as first principles endowed with such certainty that it would not be necessary to use any hypothesis whatsoever.
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Finally, the inability of new philosophers of taking the experimental character of the new science serious is underlined. Rochon notes for example that, once again, moderns pretend to more than they are actually able to accomplish. They pretend that they can anticipate the outcome of experiments (prévenir les effets de la nature), but the best that they can do is to retroactively predict this outcome when the experiment has already been performed. In this, they are similar to Cardano, who wanted to defend and illustrate his rules in astrology by drawing up the horoscopes of the dead. When he tried to extend his computations to future events concerning the living, what actually happened obliged him to resume his computations to adapt them to the actual events, once again retroactively. Like the moderns laughing at the ancients because they are unable to explain the transformation of flour into bread or the transition from a living dog to the cadaver of a dog, and pointing out that Descartes had challenged the Jesuits to find an issue on which his philosophy would not be more satisfactory than the philosophy of the School, Rochon challenges a whole assembly of Cartesians at the end of his book to explain the simplest thing, the formation of a pumpkin in a single night. His prognosis is, as one might guess, that they will be unable to do better than to parade once again with their "certain ways," "certain 
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The most elaborate argument in this respect is Pardies' Discours de la connaissance des bêtes. 104 The first part set out the Cartesian arguments against the existence of animal souls so clearly that Pardies was accused by some of his fellows of being a cryptoCartesian. 105 In the second part however, Pardies presents a rigorous defense of animal souls.
As a first step, Pardies proceeds psychologically: he seeks to establish the existence of a purely sensible knowledge, distinct from the intellectual or spiritual knowledge, by which we know that we know, something that implies reflexivity. the same effect as Pardies' distinction between mere perception and perception of oneself, namely, to assign to animal and to man two operations that are independent one from the other.
were well formed, or if they were roman or italic characters. 108 The question at this point is to know what may be the ontological foundation of the sensitive knowledge that mere perception is, as distinguished from intellectual perception.
In a second step, Pardies once again asserts that, since it is distinguished from intellectual perception, sensible perception need not be associated with the mind. 109 On the other hand, figures, arrangements of parts, dispositions, none of this can enable us to understand how an animal could feel: we must then say that there is beyond all that some other principle, which we call form, and because these operations are not beyond corporal power, there is no need to say that this is a pure spirit, but rather that it may be a material form.
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Once the concept of material form is advanced, the third and last step is logically to show that this concept can be conceived, that is, that it is not contradictory; Pardies actually contents himself with showing that it is conceivable by his opponents. Indeed he proceeds ad hominem, noting that to explain the phenomena the new philosophers themselves need to admit the existence of motion, which is neither a bodily substance, nor a spiritual substance, but a mode of the body. 111 In the same way, the ancient philosophers would be entitled to admit substantial forms, which, "being neither bodies, nor modes, nor accidents of bodies, are nevertheless something corporeal," namely, in the case of animals, this something that makes us say of them that they are, precisely, animated.
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Another social twist
As we have noted, the strategy adopted by the old philosophers is often to turn the arguments of the new philosophers back on themselves. This concerns in particular the use of language:
as we have seen, the old philosophers criticize the new philosophers for being all words when they state that some corpuscles endowed with certain motions are the causes of certain phenomena. Another example would be the way they accuse Descartes of playing with words 42 when, introducing a distinction between "indefinite" and "infinite," he qualifies the world as "indefinite," and not "infinite." 113 But the explanation that the ancient philosophers give of this relation to language is not the desire to appear more knowledgeable than common people.
According to the old philosophers, the problem with the modern philosophers is rather that they are superficially only interested in public approval. Again and again, their ignorance of old philosophy is outlined and it is generally noted that they did not bother to acquire the skills necessary for the practice of philosophy. 114 According to the old philosophers, they do not seek to establish anything serious, but only to call attention to themselves in the salons by making fun of their opponents, even by insulting them. Rochon is here most telling:
Your gentlemen speak easily; when in the midst of a circle, they say whatever they please regarding the doctrine of Aristotle, with no one there to contradict them. First and remarkably enough, the two sides agree on a certain number of points: both accept the methodological principle that one must not multiply beings without necessity, they oppose the use of empty words, they criticize the abuse of the principle of authority, they want to ensure respect for the established religion. On all these points, old philosophers respond in echo to new philosophers, and as I will explain shortly, they had thus already conceded a great deal, not only in rhetorical techniques, but also in philosophical principles. This is not to say that these new philosophers and these old philosophers agree on everything. Our systematic confrontation allows us to isolate the key issue of their opposition, the question of whether or not one needs substantial forms when doing natural philosophy. This question appears in three of the arguments I have isolated:
(1) For the new philosophers substantial forms lead to the unnecessary multiplication of beings since they are not necessary for causal explanations of phenomena. For the old philosophers, they are a metaphysical supplement, the function of which is not to explain physical phenomena, but to serve as their foundation.
(2) For the new philosophers, the elimination of substantial forms is tied to the bipartition of beings between body and soul. For the old philosophers, one needs substantial forms, and more generally entities that can be reduced neither to body nor to soul, to account for sensible qualities and for the sensitive knowledge of animals.
(3) As for religion, which I deliberately left aside, the question is to know, if it is the elimination or the conservation of substantial forms that is the most respectful of religion. Both ancients and moderns affirm that the positions of their opponents on substantial souls can lead to certain difficulties with respect to the beliefs of established religion. For example, moderns say that substantial forms are material and perishable, and thus constitute a precedent that can lead libertines to wonder if our human souls are in fact immaterial and immortal. 122 But, turning their arguments against the new philosophers in a procedure that we have often encountered in this paper, ancients say that refusing substantial forms to animals will sooner or later lead most of us to think that there is no reason to make an exception for men. 123 Pardies notes that, given the symmetry between the two arguments, such a reductio ad libertinum does not constitute a way to conclude in either direction:
Some think that this opinion that denies souls for animal is dangerous and that it favors the impiety of the libertines…: For, they say, once one admits that all the operations of animals can be carried out without a soul and by the sole machine of the body, we will soon take the next step and say that all operations of men can also be done by a similar disposition of the machine of their body.… They don't perhaps reflect that one can oppose a similar reasoning and say that once you admit that everything admirable that happens with animals can happen by means of a material soul, would you not soon take the next step and say that everything that happens in men can also be done by means of a material soul? Up to then everything is equal:
one has no more right than the other to reproach their feelings and to make them odious on the grounds of the consequences that could be drawn in favor of the impious.
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To tell the truth, one gets the impression that this is rather used as a deterrent for one's opponent than an opportunity to explore in greater depth the general concepts concerning the world and what we can know of it. Considering the symmetries existing between arguments in general, one wonders if this controversy had any winner. And in a sense, we knew the answer to this question right from the beginning. I wanted to give the old philosophers a chance to speak for themselves, and to avoid writing a triumphalist history where the new follows the old as day follows night. Their actual competences in physics are quite diverse, the two extremes being Pardies and La
Grange: the first one was a brilliant scientist, who offered a pertinent criticism of Newtonian optics, the second one seems to be totally uninformed about seventeenth-century physics, and goes from one bit of nonsense to the next when dealing with the relativity of motion. This can be easily shown by wondering what exactly the old philosophers meant to defend in the scholastic entities, and in particular with regards to substantial forms. 127 In the Aristotelian tradition saying that a natural being has a substantial form is a first approximation to answering three questions: why is this being a substance rather than a collection of properties? Why is it a substance, so that some of its properties reestablish themselves after undergoing a change? Why is it a substance of this species rather than of another? The issue is not only to affirm the existence of entities known as "substantial forms," but to cover reality with a complex network of distinctions, for example between But in the texts we have been examining, our ancients do not make these distinctions and enter only rarely into this type of discussion. 128 To make themselves understandable to the new public of honnêtes gens, they do not burden themselves with these details, and sometimes seem to content themselves with the affirmation that substantial forms exist. And in so doing, they concede a lot, for the new philosophers' criticism of the old philosophy did not simply concern the existence of substantial forms, but also that of a multitude of lesser beings, of complex distinctions, and the endless discussions that accompanied them. In other words, the old philosophers came to defend substantial forms in a spirit that was no longer scholastic. But substantial forms without scholasticism were nothing, or at least not much.
They were no longer philosophical tools, but hollow and empty shells, symbols of the social positions that the old philosophers wanted to defend, inasmuch as they were teachers in the schools and universities, preceptors and spiritual directors. As is often the case, only when a belief is utterly dead it becomes important to defend it.
However, one last swing of the pendulum is necessary. Namely, it is striking to note that the criticisms the old philosophers addressed against Cartesianism are precisely the same who will be found again during Enlightenment: to neglect experience, to try to get away with using general words, to neglect phenomena that do not square with a predefined categorization of beings. In this sense, one can say that the ancient philosophers did not really lose their war, at least not completely: they participated in discussions of their time that determined the subsequent criticisms of Cartesianism. No doubt there is also a lesson in here, one general enough for us to conclude with. When the history of philosophy is not confined to a given work or to the works of a given author, it is often written like a play: stars lead, followed by a second-rate supporting cast, heroically taking turns on center stage, one coming to dethrone the preceding ones. Without doubt we will have to learn to write the 128 Rather surprisingly, the most detailed discussion on the different scholastic options concerning substantial forms is to be found in Rohault, Entretiens sur la philosophie, pp. 112-117.'
